ULRICH HOFMEISTER: Why Ukraine Cannot Be Considered a Russian Colony

Ulrich Hofmeister / lmu-munich.academia.edu

Since 2014, historians have increasingly examined Russian-Ukrainian relations through the lens of colonialism, placing them within the global context of imperial domination and anti-colonial resistance. However, there is another, no less compelling perspective on this issue. Perhaps its most comprehensive expression can be found in the concept proposed by German scholar Ulrich Hofmeister. As a specialist in the history of Eastern Europe, he argues that when describing the actual relationship between Russia and Ukraine, the concept of “colonialism” loses its analytical value.

WHO IS ULRICH HOFMEISTER?

orking at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Ulrich Hofmeister primarily studies how the Russian Empire governed the countries of Central Asia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and how the notion of a “civilizing mission” on the empire’s peripheries took shape among imperial elites. Among his best-known monographs on the subject is The Burden of the White Tsar, published in 2019. As you may have guessed, the title deliberately alludes to Kipling’s famous poem The White Man’s Burden. Taking British practices as a model, the Russian imperial authorities sought to instill European values in the region while completely disregarding the traditions and interests of the local population. It was precisely this inflexibility that ultimately brought attempts to “civilize” Turkestan to a dead end.

In addition, in 2024 Hofmeister became co-editor and co-author of the project Imperial Cities in the Tsarist, Habsburg, and Ottoman Empires, which examines how the authorities used urban architecture to demonstrate imperial power and control over multiethnic populations. Another particular focus of his research is the plans for ideal European cities that were transplanted onto Russian soil. In 2026, in the pages of Slavic Review, Ulrich initiated an important scholarly debate by advancing the thesis that the concept of classical colonialism cannot be applied to every region of the Russian Empire, even though it was undoubtedly a colonial state. Ukraine, in particular, is not, in his view, a case of such “classical” colonialism. The scholar set out his position on this issue in his work Colonialism or Colonization? Why the Difference Between Ukraine and Central Asia Matters. Since it sparked considerable debate both in Europe and in Ukraine itself, the editors of our almanac could not pass over this discussion. Let us try to understand why Hofmeister does not regard Ukraine as a Russian colony.

AN EMPIRE THAT COLONIZED ITSELF

According to the historian, the Russian Empire can undoubtedly be regarded as a colonial state. However, the nature of its rule over different territories was not uniform. This becomes clear if we distinguish between two concepts: “colonization” and “colonialism”. Colonization can refer both to migration and the establishment of settlements and to the political subjugation of other peoples. Colonialism, by contrast, is a specific system of illegitimate foreign domination. Hofmeister insists that, for historical analysis, establishing the existence of violence, exploitation, or dependency is not enough. It is necessary to determine precisely what kind of relationships connected rulers and subjects, and what perceptions of their differences underpinned the exercise of power.

This is where the distinction between Ukraine and, for example, Central Asia becomes apparent… First, let us recall that the word “colonization” entered the Russian language in the 1820s and, after the Crimean War, became one of the central concepts of Russian historical self-understanding. Sergei Solovyov and Vasily Klyuchevsky argued that the history of Russia was the history of a country colonizing itself. In the Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary, the entry “Colonization” described European overseas expansion — Spanish possessions in the Americas, French possessions in North Africa, and British possessions in India. Yet the entry “Colonization of Russia” painted an entirely different picture: colonization was presented as the peaceful, gradual settlement of Russian peasants in the north, east, and south. At the same time, Siberia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia — regions where the colonial nature of Russian expansion was particularly evident — were effectively excluded from consideration. This fostered the notion that European powers conquered “foreign” lands, while Russia developed lands that were already “its own”.

HOW CONQUERED LANDS BECAME “PRIMORDIALLY RUSSIAN”

Beginning in the eighteenth century, the Russian elite started comparing their empire with others. Geographer Ivan Kirilov proposed that Empress Anna Ioannovna establish control over the Kazakh Steppe following the European colonial model. Under Catherine II, this tendency intensified: Siberia, Russian America, and the Black Sea steppe were compared with European colonies. The name “Novorossiya” (New Russia) echoed its counterparts — New Spain, New France, and New England. Later, the perception of the Black Sea region as a colonial possession gradually gave way to the idea of developing “primordially Russian” lands. By the late nineteenth century, colonial terminology had once again entered discussions about Ukraine. Economist Mykola Yasnopolsky saw evidence of colonialism in the fact that the taxes paid by Ukraine exceeded government expenditure on the region. In the early twentieth century, historians Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Serhiy Yefremov compared the situation of the “Little Russians” to colonial realities in Africa. Contemporary Canadian historian of Ukrainian origin Stephen Velychenko points to Mykola Stasiuk, who, in 1911, was the first to apply the concept of “Russian colonialism” to Ukraine.

Nevertheless, such assessments were the exception rather than the rule — Ukrainian and Russian identities were not mutually exclusive, as many Ukrainians considered themselves part of the “all-Russian people”. The Revolution of 1917 gave impetus to a lasting interpretation of Ukraine as a colony, first of Tsarist Russia and then of Bolshevik Russia. This perception subsequently persisted among émigrés, while Soviet historiography emphasized the unity of peoples. Following the collapse of the USSR, the postcolonial perspective once again gained relevance. However, Velychenko himself cautioned that Ukraine’s similarities to former colonies explained little in themselves. Yaroslav Hrytsak noted that Ukraine, as part of the imperial core, was simultaneously a center of both power and resistance to it. Andreas Kappeler likewise did not regard Ukraine, culturally and geographically close to the imperial metropolis, as a classical colony. But the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 brought its own adjustments. Historians Ilya Gerasimov, Timothy Snyder, and even the aforementioned Velychenko called for Ukrainian history to be viewed through the lens of the experiences of colonized societies. The events of 2022 provided further arguments in support of this position. Nevertheless, to understand the past adequately, Hofmeister proposes returning to the “starting point” — the realities of the Russian Empire.

A COLONY THAT WAS NOT CALLED A COLONY

Let us compare Ukraine with the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan. To contemporaries, the colonial nature of Russian expansion into this region was obvious. In 1864, Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov compared it with the actions of the United States on the American continent, France in Algeria, the Netherlands in its colonies, and Great Britain in India. According to publicist Mikhail Katkov, the only difference was that Russia and Central Asia were separated not by seas but by deserts. In 1912, Alexander Krivoshein, head of the Main Administration of Land Management and Agriculture, explicitly regarded Turkestan as a colony that should generate economic benefits. Vestnik Evropy (Herald of Europe) described England and Russia as great powers fulfilling a historical mission to spread European civilization.

Russian officials even traveled to India and North Africa to study European methods of governing conquered peoples, particularly to avoid repeating the mistakes made by the British in India. Yet while emulating Western powers, Russia simultaneously denied the colonial nature of its own rule. Its Asian territories were officially regarded as “a single colony”. Russian expansion was justified by the need for defense rather than a desire for profit. It was believed that, unlike the British, Russians did not dominate conquered peoples but instead “befriended” them. Thus emerged the idea of a distinct Russian path. At the same time, Western colonialism remained the principal point of reference for both supporters and critics of Russian expansion. In their writings, one can find almost no comparisons between the administration of Central Asia and the practices of the Ottoman, Habsburg, Persian, or Chinese empires.

COLONIALISM AS THE “MANAGEMENT OF DIFFERENCES”

Jürgen Osterhammel described colonialism as a relationship between a local majority population and a minority of foreign conquerors who often make decisions in the interests of a distant metropolis. The key element here is the perception of foreignness. It is no coincidence that postcolonial theorist Partha Chatterjee defined colonialism as the “management of differences” — religious, cultural, civilizational, linguistic, or racial. However, such boundaries were not fixed, colonialism did not preclude assimilation, and in practice it was not easy to distinguish colonizers from the colonized. For this reason, Frederick Cooper prefers to speak of the “politics of difference”. Saliha Belmessous, meanwhile, demonstrates how colonial projects sought to transform the identities of subjugated populations through cultural rapprochement. This, however, did not erase the original dividing line — local inhabitants had to prove themselves worthy of admission into “civilized” European society.

In Turkestan, such distinctions formed the foundation of the political and social order. The category of “Russians” included not only ethnic Russians but also other Europeans — Germans, Poles, Ashkenazi Jews, and Ukrainians. Segregation extended into everyday life. Cities were frequently divided into “Russian” and “native” quarters. Mixed marriages remained extremely rare. Full legal integration of the indigenous population was not permitted, as this would have meant Europeans relinquishing their privileged position. The peoples of Central Asia were excluded from the empire’s general estate system. They were subject to special rights and obligations, as well as separate administrative and judicial mechanisms. In elections, they formed special electoral curiae and had limited representation. This division persisted until 1917. It was precisely this system that made Russian rule in Turkestan comparable to British rule in India or French rule in North Africa. In Ukraine, however, an entirely different logic prevailed…

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“UNEQUAL BROTHERS”?

Hofmeister identifies two main reasons why the classical concept of colonialism is unsuitable for describing Russian-Ukrainian relations. First, the historical and cultural proximity of the two peoples. Second, the absence of a policy of institutional separation between them. Of course, one must be careful not to fall for Russian propaganda by interpreting this cultural proximity as “primordial”. After all, it is largely the result of imperial domination and Russification. The Muscovite state and Cossack Ukraine were distinct political entities, not a single people that “reunited” in 1654. Moscow frequently demanded that people arriving from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth be baptized again, while negotiations preceding the Pereiaslav Agreement were conducted with the assistance of interpreters. Nevertheless, the cultural distance between Russians and Ukrainians was considerably smaller than that between the British and Indians or the French and North Africans. This did not make Russians and Ukrainians a single people, but it created a situation uncharacteristic of classical relations between a metropolis and its colony. Andreas Kappeler proposed the metaphor of “unequal brothers” to describe it.

The Russian Empire did not seek to establish Ukrainians as a legally distinct colonial population. On the contrary, it made every effort to incorporate them into imperial structures while simultaneously destroying Ukrainian political institutions. Thus, the restrictions imposed on the autonomy and rights of the Cossack Hetmanate in the eighteenth century culminated in the abolition of the Zaporizhian Sich. Yet Ukrainians did not become a separate category of colonial subjects comparable to the “natives” of Turkestan. Cities were not divided into Ukrainian and Russian quarters, and mixed marriages were commonplace. Social estate, age, and gender played a greater role in social life than nationality. To integrate into the dominant culture, Ukrainians did not need to change their religion or renounce their origins. They could readily pursue careers in Moscow and St. Petersburg, exerting considerable influence on state policy — a situation inconceivable in Western European colonies! None of this negates the existence of imperial hierarchy and cultural oppression. However, it was Russian absolutism, rather than a system of classical colonial segregation, that deprived Ukrainians of their freedom. In Central Asia, Russia ruled by emphasizing the differences between itself and the conquered peoples. In Ukraine, it ruled by denying the very existence of those differences. The concept of “nationalist appropriation” describes such a policy more accurately.

WHEN THE SUBJUGATED BECOME COLONIZERS

The “colonizer–colonized” model is further complicated by another historical circumstance. Under certain conditions, Ukrainians were not merely subjects of imperial domination but also participants in the territorial expansion of the imperial colonial project. The settlement of Cossacks and Ukrainian peasants in the south and east resembles European settler colonialism. A significant part of modern Ukraine is the result of imperial conquests that affected the lands of the Crimean Tatars and Nogais, whose displacement and marginalization correspond more closely to the classical model of colonization. Once again, it must be emphasized that Ukrainian participation in imperial expansion went hand in hand with the destruction of Ukrainian identity. And this can be even more devastating than a policy of colonial separation.

Something similar occurred in the nineteenth century, during the formation of European nation-states such as France, Italy, and Spain. Occitan, Sardinian, Catalan, and other regional languages were marginalized or subjected to restrictions. They were portrayed as dialects of dominant languages and sacrificed in the name of cultural unification and the creation of a single nation. The transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a Turkish nation-state was accompanied by violence against Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, and other peoples. Greenland experienced a deeply painful process of integration with Denmark even after its formal decolonization in 1953. Russia’s policy of suppressing the Ukrainian language followed a similar logic: Ukrainians were to be completely absorbed into a single Russian national community. Therefore, rejecting the classification of Ukraine as a classical colony does not mean justifying Russian domination.

A COLONY CAN BE LET GO, BUT A “PART OF THE HOMELAND” CANNOT!

In 1833, British politician Thomas Macaulay observed that one day Indians might be ready for European political institutions. He even described such a prospect as the greatest achievement in British history. In general, classical colonial systems allowed, at least theoretically, for the possibility of an end to foreign rule. This is why, in the 1950s and 1960s, European societies came to terms with the loss of their overseas possessions relatively easily. A colony can be let go. But what if a territory under a state’s control is considered part of the national homeland? Losing it calls into question the very conception of the state and nation. This happened, for example, with Algeria, which the French state formally regarded as part of France, leading to a bloody war that triggered a severe political crisis in the metropolis. Modern Russia operates according to a similar logic.

The separation of Central Asia, which more closely corresponded to the classical colonial model, is not perceived as particularly painful. But the independence of Ukraine and Belarus is an entirely different matter: historically, they were not regarded as external colonies but were perceived as part of Russia itself. This logic permeates not only Putin’s article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”. Joseph Brodsky’s well-known poem about Ukrainian independence illustrates how painfully some members of the Russian intellectual elite perceived Ukraine’s separation. However, as the examples of England’s attitude toward Ireland and Spain’s toward Catalonia demonstrate, this situation is not unique. The Irish analogy is particularly fruitful. For centuries, the Irish were subjected to exploitation and forced assimilation, yet they were simultaneously considered part of the imperial political sphere. It is therefore no coincidence that Ireland served as an important point of reference for the Ukrainian national movement during the late imperial and early Soviet periods. Nor should we overlook another danger that Ukrainian independence poses: historical and cultural proximity means that Ukraine has the potential to exert considerable influence on Russian society. And for Russia’s authoritarian system, this represents a serious challenge.

“NATIONALIST APPROPRIATION” AS A CAUSE OF WAR

According to Hofmeister, an excessive expansion of the concept of “colonialism” creates a methodological problem. If the “management of differences” is considered an essential characteristic of colonialism, then not all relationships of domination between peoples should be classified as colonial. What matters is not merely establishing the fact of subjugation but distinguishing between different forms of domination. The historian argues that an overly broad interpretation of the term “colonialism” paradoxically helps present the Russian experience as an exceptional case in the global history of colonialism. Yet this is not the case. The postcolonial approach is entirely applicable to Ukraine, but it requires examining the specific elements of “coloniality” present in Russia’s treatment of Ukraine, which is no less violent as a result.

The principal mechanism of Russian domination was “nationalist appropriation” — a centuries-long refusal to recognize Ukraine as a distinct nation with its own language, political tradition, history, and right to statehood. The historian considers this “appropriation” one of the fundamental causes of the current war. At first glance, the German historian’s arguments seem entirely logical, but not everyone agreed with them. Hofmeister’s theses provoked strong objections from some of his colleagues, particularly the prominent Ukrainian historian Anton Kotenko, who is affiliated with Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf. He was also criticized by other researchers who largely draw on the work of Stephen Velychenko.

RUSSIAN AGGRESSION: NATIONALISM OR COLONIALISM?

Critics argue that Hofmeister interprets the concept of “otherness” too simplistically. In their view, colonialism is based not only on racial or religious foreignness but also on cultural hierarchy. Therefore, the fact that the imperial authorities did not regard Ukrainians as “foreigners” and allowed them to pursue careers is irrelevant. In cultural terms, this was typical colonialism. One need only recall the Valuev Circular or the Ems Ukaz, which imposed restrictions on the Ukrainian language. Ukrainian culture was undoubtedly perceived by the empire as “inferior” and “provincial”, a classic feature of colonial oppression. Opponents emphasize that Hofmeister overlooks another dimension — the economic one. For the imperial center, Ukraine was a major source of raw materials, supplying grain, coal, and metals. Consequently, the region’s modernization was selective, driven exclusively by the needs of the metropolis, which is characteristic of colonial systems. Hofmeister is also criticized for attempting to assess the Russian Empire according to the standards of British or French overseas territories. In continental empires such as the Russian and Habsburg empires, colonial practices were often disguised as administrative integration. Yet this did not alter the essential nature of the oppression and subjugation of indigenous populations.

Hofmeister, however, did not leave his critics unanswered, putting forward the following formula: “If absolutely everything is colonial, then nothing is colonial”. He insists that avoiding absurdity and confusion is straightforward — one simply needs to distinguish between colonization (the process of territorial development, migration, and integration) and colonialism (a system of institutional separation). The Ukrainian case, therefore, represents colonization without colonialism. Hofmeister interprets the policies of present-day Russia specifically as nationalism. At the same time, he rejects accusations that his position somehow diminishes Ukraine’s tragedy or justifies Russian aggression. In his view, Russia’s refusal to recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty and identity is a typical manifestation of “nationalist usurpation”, in which one nation declares that another nation does not exist and is merely part of itself. Hofmeister is convinced that analyzing this phenomenon requires the conceptual tools of nationalism theory rather than mechanically copying the approaches of Western postcolonialism. In any case, given the intensity of the debate, it is far from over. What do you think? What is Ukraine resisting today — Russian nationalism or the Russian Empire 2.0?