UNKNOWN AFRICA. MYTH 5: Foreign aid is ineffective

Writer, journalist, Ph.D., professor at the University of Cambridge, author of the bestselling book How Asia works

UNKNOWN AFRICA. MYTH 5: Foreign aid is ineffective

Art design: huxley.media via Photoshop

The concept of a «stereotype» was introduced back in 1922 by American sociologist Walter Lippmann. Since then, humanity has repeatedly realized how difficult it is to step beyond the «picture in one’s head». Joe Studwell is one of the few who has managed to overcome the inertia of thought and build a bridge of understanding between cultures.

For more than 20 years, he served as the editor of China Economic Quarterly. His years of research resulted in the bestselling book The Asian Management Model (How Asia Works). Today, Studwell takes on an equally ambitious challenge: helping us understand how Africa works.

In an exclusive interview for Huxley, he debunks nine myths about Africa that persist in Western cultural consciousness. Let’s embark on an engaging and stereotype-free journey across the African continent with him.

ccording to data from the World Bank, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa officially received $62.3 billion in aid in 2021 (no data available for subsequent years). Over the previous decade, aid accounted for between 2.6% and 4.0% of the region’s gross national income. In several African countries — including Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, and Madagascar — this figure exceeded 30%.

The role of international aid in the continent’s development has faced heavy criticism. The books The White Man’s Burden by William Easterly (published in 2006) and Dead Aid by Dambisa Moyo (2009) dealt a major blow to the sector. Easterly argued that $2.3 trillion had been spent by the global community to support Africa over the previous five decades, with minimal results.

He condemned centralized planning — even though every successful developing country in East Asia had followed precisely that path — and criticized «development experts, the heirs of missionaries and colonial administrators». Moyo was even more blunt: «Aid has been and continues to be an unmitigated political, economic, and humanitarian disaster for most developing countries».

However, the biggest problem with economic aid lies in the politicization and ideological bias of those who distribute it. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) virtually ceased investing in agriculture during the 1980s and 1990s — contributing to a decline in African agricultural output — and still avoids supporting industrial development due to concerns about centralized planning.

Instead, parts of USAID have been integrated into military command structures, providing food aid to regions such as Iraq and Syria where U.S. troops are deployed. It’s hard to classify that as development assistance.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation, created in 2004 by President George W. Bush and allocated additional funds to provide large grants to «good» governments, requires recipients to pass assessments on democracy and economic freedom.

At the beginning of his second term in 2025, President Donald Trump suspended nearly all USAID disbursements, including funding for healthcare.

Among all Western bilateral aid agencies claiming to support agriculture, none addresses land reform, farmer credit, or support for agricultural cooperatives due to the political sensitivity surrounding «leftist» initiatives.

In the case of agricultural cooperatives, this is especially odd, considering that in nearly all developed countries, agricultural inputs and marketing depend on cooperatives that help reduce costs and maximize income.

Wealthy nations are increasingly reluctant to cooperate with the governments of developing countries. The solution to poor governance and corruption in African states is now seen in partnering with non-governmental organizations. When the Millennium Development Goals were formulated in 2015, wealthy donor countries did so with virtually no participation from the governments of developing nations.

Despite numerous shortcomings — many of which stem from ideological missteps by donor countries — the claim that aid is useless does not hold up to scrutiny. Even in the most disadvantaged regions of Africa, aid programs bring about positive change. These changes may not always translate into rapid economic growth, but they are measurable.

Since 2000, the proportion of African children dying within their first year of life has dropped from 8% to 4%. The share of children dying before the age of five has decreased from 15% to 7%. A reduction in child mortality has been observed across all countries on the continent. Malaria cases have been cut by more than half — thanks to eradication campaigns, the use of mosquito nets, and other preventive measures.

The share of women using contraception increased from 22% in 2000 to 33% in 2019, and the likelihood of an African woman living to the age of 65 rose from 46% to 61%. Aid programs played a key role in these improvements, and Africa has shown one of the fastest rates of health advancement in the world.

In terms of economic development, the aid system has provided support to all of Africa’s most successful developing countries — Mauritius, Botswana, Ethiopia, and Rwanda — on a scale far greater than their population sizes would suggest. The governments of these nations used the funds effectively, and donors, in turn, were satisfied to see projects completed on time and within budget.

There are regression analyses highlighting that economic aid, overall, has not led Africa to economic growth. However, these studies often include periods such as the Cold War, when a significant portion of funds was directed not toward development but toward supporting military and political allies. Since 2000, data shows a correlation between aid and economic growth in Africa, although development is not the only goal of donor countries.

These conclusions are consistent with what we know about East Asia. When China began its reforms in the 1980s — which led to the most significant reduction in poverty in human history — technical consultations from the World Bank were critically important in shaping its policies.

China did not request recommendations for its actions — it set its own agenda. The World Bank was initially invited to provide experts from Eastern Europe familiar with reforming communist systems. China also requested and received concessional loans, becoming the Bank’s largest borrower.

Long before that, between 1946 and 1978, the United States provided $6 billion in aid to South Korea and $2.4 billion to Taiwan. These amounts were so significant that U.S. aid accounted for 15% of South Korea’s GNI in the 1950s and 6% of Taiwan’s — far more than what African countries receive.

In Taiwan, the U.S. funded half of all agricultural investments and paid for the establishment of the densest network of agricultural advisers in the world. Unlike current practice, U.S. aid at that time came without conditions.

For example, the U.S. hired consultants to identify new products that Taiwanese companies could manufacture and developed tax incentives to support exports. The fact that Taiwanese producers competed with American companies was not an obstacle to providing aid. This is not the kind of policy the Trump administration would apply in Africa.

The criticism from William Easterly and Dambisa Moyo is unjustified for three reasons. First, it is based on the myth that East Asia’s development occurred without international aid and solely through free-market mechanisms, without state planning.

In reality, the region’s most successful economies received substantial international aid and combined market competition with carefully crafted national development plans. Second, contrary to the claims of these authors, aid has also played a significant role in Africa and has delivered a favorable cost-benefit ratio for donors — at least since the end of the Cold War.

And third, when aid failed to deliver the desired outcomes, it was more often due to donor errors rather than those of the recipients. While Africa has certainly seen its share of failed aid programs — as have other developing regions — overall, since its post–World War II expansion, support from developed nations has contributed to improved health, education, and living standards in the world’s poorest countries.